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BRANDEIS AND WARREN'S
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
AND THE BIRTH OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
BENJAMIN

E. BRATMAN °

I. INTRODUCTION AND MODERN PERSPECTIVE

It has been called an "unquestioned 'classic[I,'" 1 the "most influential law
review article of all,"'2 "one of the most brilliant excursions in the field of
theoretical jurisprudence,"' an "outstanding example of the influence of legal
periodicals upon the American law,"4 and "a pearl of common-law reasoning"
that "single-handedly created a tort."5 Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law
School from 1916 to 1936, said that it did "nothing less than add a chapter to
our law."'6 Over 100 years after it was written, courts as divergent as the
Supreme Court of Mississippi and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit have dubbed it as "momentous"7 and "brilliant. ''
*

Visiting Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
(beginning July 2002); formerly Associate Director of Legal Research and Writing, University
at Buffalo (SUNY) Law School. B.A. 1987, University of Washington; J.D. 1993, Vanderbilt
University Law School. In its original form, this Article was written for a Legal History
Seminar on the "Gilded Age," taught by Professor James W. Ely, Jr. at Vanderbilt University.
Recently, I began additional research and then made substantial revisions. I wish to thank
Professor Ely for his inspirational approach to legal history, his engaging teaching style, and his
support and suggestions during the revision process. I also received helpful guidance from
University at Buffalo faculty members Shubha Ghosh, Thom Bassett, Jeffrey Malkan, and Jim
Wooten, and invaluable help from my research assistant, Jack Trachtenberg.
I would like to dedicate this Article to Leonard Helton, former history teacher at Los
Altos High School, and Jon Bridgman, retired Professor of History at the University of
Washington, whose passion for teaching history and making it come alive evoked my love of
history and historical research. Finally, I want to express heartfelt appreciation to my brother,
David, whose love and encyclopedic knowledge of history is truly contagious, and to my
parents, Nancy and Robert, each of whom supports me in everything I do.
1. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-CitedLaw Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540, 1545
(1985).
2. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacyin Tort Law-- Were Warren andBrandeisWrong?, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoBs. 326; 327 (1966).
3. Elbridge L. Adams, The Right ofPrivacy,and its Relation to the Law ofLibel, 39 AM.
L. REV. 37, 37 (1905).
4. William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REV. 383,383 (1960).
5. Ruth Gavison, Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis Were Right on
Privacy vs. Free Speech, 43 S.C. L. REV. 437, 438 (1992).
6. ALPHEus THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946).
7. Miller v. State, 636 So. 2d 391, 394 (Miss. 1994).
8. Albert D. Seeno Constr. Co. Ltd. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 94-17024,94-17039,
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These are some of the accolades that have been bestowed upon an ageless
law review article, penned over a century ago by future Supreme Court Justice
Louis Dembitz Brandeis and Boston attorney Samuel Warren: The Right to
Privacy,4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).' The citation alone is a ubiquitous one
in privacy law circles and familiar to most lawyers or scholars whose work
has touched on the law's protections of privacy.
In their twenty-eight page piece, Brandeis and Warren chastised the
journalists of their day, particularly photojournalists, for prying into people's
private lives in search of tawdry and alluring "news," and then made a cogent
plea for the law to recognize a right to privacy and to impose liability in tort
for these and other types of invasions of privacy. They got what they
wanted-and more.
Brandeis and Warren's work is almost universally regarded as the origin
of the four invasion of privacy torts that are recognized in most American
jurisdictions today and that are laid out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
as follows: (1) "unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another," (2)
"appropriation of the other's name or likeness," (3) "unreasonable publicity
given to the other's private life," and (4) "publicity that unreasonably places
the other in a false light before the public."' 0 But the influence of Brandeis
and Warren's article now extends far beyond the limited realm of tort law. In
the more than 110 years since its publication, Brandeis and Warren's article
has attained what some might call legendary status. It has been widely
recognized by scholars and judges, past and present, as the seminal force in
the development of a "right to privacy" in American law."

1997 WL 285930, at *2 (9th Cir. May 27, 1997).
9. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). For the general view that the
article is the origin of modem tort law on privacy, see James H. Barron, Warren andBrandeis,
The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13
SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 875, 877 (1979) (stating that there is "near unanimity among courts and
commentators that the Warren-Brandeis conceptualization created the structural andjurisprudential
foundation of the tort of invasion of privacy"), and Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth ofPrivacy Law:
A Century Since Warren and Brandeis,39 CATH. U. L. REv. 703, 718-19 (1990).
11. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905) ("[A]
claim to a right of privacy, independent of a property or contractual right, or some right of a
similar nature, had, up to [1890], never been recognized in terms in any decision."); Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902) (informing that the right to
privacy has not "been asserted prior to about the year 1890, when it was presented with
attractiveness, and no inconsiderable ability, in the Harvard Law Review"); Elbridge L. Adams,
The Law of Privacy, 175 N. AM. REV. 361, 364 (1902); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of
Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1335, 1342-47; Prosser, supra note 4, at 383. For more recent
pronouncements on the foundational and seminal nature of the article, see, for example,
Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518,521 (7th Cir. 1995) (including Judge Posner's comment that
"the legal concept of privacy.. .originated in a famous article by Warren and Brandeis"), and
West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640,642 (Tenn. 2001) (remarking in a false
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In the view of at least one scholar, virtually all of the varied twentieth
century jurisprudence that could be said to fall within the parameters of
"privacy law"-whether it be the federal constitutional zone of privacy
implicated in abortion, "right to die," and other like cases; statutes prohibiting
the disclosure of the identity of rape victims; privacy initiatives in state
constitutions; or invasion of privacy tort actions-in theory can be traced back
ultimately to Brandeis and Warren's assertion in 1890 that we all have what
Judge Thomas Cooley called "a right to be let alone."' 2 As an example, in the
1965 landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 3 when the Supreme Court
established a constitutional right of privacy drawn from the "penumbra" of
several amendments in the Bill of Rights, dissenting Justice Hugo Black
claimed the Court was "exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in
discussing grounds for tort relief, to the level of a constitutional rule."' 4
Indeed, it has been suggested that The Right to Privacy "developed and
articulated a concept that provided some of the basis for the constitutional
right to privacy, although the proximity of this relationship remains a subject
of debate." 5

light invasion of privacy case that "Warren and... Brandeis... established the concept of the
right to privacy in the common law"). See also infra Part III.A for a historical analysis of the
unprecedented nature of a common law "right to privacy" in the late nineteenth century.
12. Gormley, supra note 11, at 1340, 1342-43. Gormley postulates that there are five
general areas of privacy law, and contends the seeds of each of them were planted by Brandeis
and Warren. He identifies: (1) "[t]ort privacy;" (2) "Fourth Amendment privacy;" (3) "First
Amendment privacy;" (4) "[f]undamental-decision privacy" (such as abortion); and (5) "[s]tate
constitutional privacy." Id. at 1340.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Id. at 510 n.I (Black, J., dissenting).
15. Symposium: The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 643, 643 (1991). This article was one of several presented in 1990 at various symposia
commemorating the 100th anniversary of The Right to Privacy's publication. In addition to
Case Western Reserve Law School, Northern Illinois University Law School, and the Boalt Hall
School of Law at the University of California at Berkeley conducted 100th anniversary
symposia. See 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. No. 3, at ii (1990); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to
PrivacyRevisited: Privacy,News, and Social Change, 1890-1990,80 CAL L. REv. 1133, 1133
n.t (1992). Articles presented at the centennial symposia covered a wide range of topics. See,
e.g., Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy GotIts Gender, 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 441(1990)
(discussing gender bias in privacy law); Dorothy Glancy, Privacyand the Other Miss M, 10 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 401 (1990) (considering the rights of entertainment figures to prevent advertisers
from using impersonations of their voices to endorse products); Richard C. Turkington, Legacy
of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered ConstitutionalRight to
Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479 (1990) (addressing the developing
constitutional right to informational privacy in the electronic age).
The 100th anniversary was even newsworthy enough to warrant an article in The New
York Times that discussed Brandeis and Warren's piece and its influence on later legal
decisions. Linda Greenhouse, Milestone Anniversaryfor the Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1990, at 22.
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Of course, Brandeis and Warren's work has attracted, and continues to
attract, the attention of the bench. In a wide variety of recent opinions on
privacy-related questions, state and federal court judges have proclaimed
Brandeis and Warren's article to be the original source of a privacy right in
American law and, to varying degrees, have analyzed the article's arguments
as part of the opinions' reasoning. For example, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky called upon Brandeis and Warren's article in reaching its holding
that a statute criminalizing sodomy violated the privacy and equal protection
provisions of the state constitution. 6 The Supreme Court of California did the
same when it held that the National Collegiate Athletic Association's drug-7
testing program did not violate the Privacy Initiative of its state constitution.1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit invoked Brandeis
and Warren's article to emphasize the importance of a property owner's "right
to be let alone" when it held that the Environmental Protection Agency's
placement of groundwater wells on private property was a taking under the
Fifth Amendment. 8 And the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit distinguished Brandeis and Warren's arguments in reaching its holding
that a personal injury insurance policy that covered "wrongful entry or
eviction or other invasion of an individual's right of privacy" did not cover the
settling of dust.'9 Other similar examples abound.20
Privacy law and conceptions of a right to privacy have, of course, evolved
considerably since Brandeis and Warren penned their article, but the fact
remains that judges and scholars continue to cite 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 as the
original source of a right to privacy in American legal history. Are they right?
Quite apart from any argument about how attenuated the link might be
between Brandeis and Warren's specific proposals and the current state of
privacy law,2' did Brandeis and Warren's The Right to Privacy give birth to

16.
17.

Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 494 (Ky. 1992).
Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 646-47 (Cal. 1994).

18.

Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 199 1).

19. Albert D. Seeno Constr. Co. Ltd. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 94-17024,94-17039,
1997 WL 285930, at *2 (9th Cir. May 27, 1997).
20. See, e.g., Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
prisoner's putative constitutional right to privacy was not violated by disclosure of his HIV-

positive status); Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemeade, 936 F. Supp. 235, 238-39 (D. N.J. 1996)
(holding that a discharged police officer could go forward with his lawsuit under the Videotape
Privacy Protection Act, alleging wrongful disclosure of the fact that he had rented pornographic
videotapes); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995) (holding that a
newspaper could not be held liable for publishing information from which a rape victim's

identity could be deduced by her friends).
21. Many modem scholars have questioned the viability of Brandeis and Warren's
proposed tort remedy in light of developments in First Amendment law regarding freedom of
the press and speech. These scholars have read Brandeis and Warren's arguments narrowly, and

have observed that the specific conduct ofthe print media that Brandeis and Warren contended
should be actionable in tort, had become, in the latter half of the twentieth century, staunchly
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its namesake in the lexicon and substance of American law? And, if so, how
did a law review article manage this feat?
The law and the legal and historical literature from the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century strongly support the argument that
Brandeis and Warren's article did indeed "give birth" to a right to privacy.
And it is this "birth," and the initial growth ofthe right to privacy over the two
decades after the article's publication, that form the focus of this Article.
Part U1will present a summary of what Brandeis and Warren actually
wrote in 4 HARv. L. REV. 193. While the authors focused intensely on the
conduct of the print media and commercial publishers, and while their specific
proposal was for an invasion of privacy remedy at law (for damages), the
premise of their legal argument was that the law should recognize a general
right "to be let alone." 2 The presence of this argument in the article set the
stage for courts to apply the "precedent" of 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 broadly to
a wide variety of factual scenarios, including cases against defendants other
than newspapers or commercial publishers. It also set the stage for courts to
impose equitable remedies for violations of the new right to privacy.
Part III will present what were, by all accounts, the two greatest obstacles
to the establishment of a right to privacy and an invasion of privacy remedy
in the United States in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
First, there was essentially no primary authority available in American
common law to serve as legal precedent for establishing the proposed right or
remedy. (This also lends support to the characterization of The Right to
Privacy as "giving birth" to its namesake.) Second, there was the very real
potential that Brandeis and Warren's proposed cause of action would infringe
on federal and state constitutional protections of freedom of the press and
speech.

protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the
Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutionalas Well?, 46 TEX. L.
REv. 611 (1968); Kalven, supra note 2, at 327; Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewellto Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291,
341-44 (1983); Barron, supra note 10; Lorelei Van Wey, Note, PrivateFacts Tort: TheEndls
Here, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 301-03 (1991). In recent years, some have taken up the opposing
cause, arguing that the tort for public disclosure of private facts can and should be revived. See
Gavison, supra note 5, at 438-39; John P. Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy and the First
Amendment, 102 YALE L.J. 747, 752 (1992) (advocating an invasion of privacy tort for
"outing"); Robert A. Muckenfuss, The Right "To Be Let Alone" in the 21st Century, 11 S.C.
LAW., May-June 2000, at 36-37 (advocating use of public disclosure of private facts tort to

redress dissemination of private facts through the Internet). Recent articles have also argued
for the re-invigoration of the intrusion upon seclusion tort, June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic
Privacy: New Intrusion A New Tort?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 965, 966 (2001); and the false
light tort, Nathan E. Ray, Note, Let There Be False Light: Resistingthe GrowingTrendAgainst
an Important Tort, 84 MINN. L. REv. 713 (2000).
22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 205.
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Part IV will discuss what happened notwithstanding the obstacles: the
gradual recognition by several state courts and legislatures of a right to privacy,
and legal and equitable remedies for invasion of that right. During the twenty
years after the article's publication, Brandeis and Warren's arguments were the
indisputable catalyst for the creation of a body of privacy law in several states.
The judicial opinions from 1891 until 1911 that addressed claims of invasion of
an alleged right to privacy almost invariably cited and discussed Brandeis and
Warren's article, and most opinions recognizing a right to privacy placed
substantial reliance on the article as a form of authority. Moreover, many of the
state legislatures that enacted statutes protecting privacy during the same time
period were prompted by Brandeis and Warren's arguments. Acceptance of a
right to privacy and the invasion of privacy tort was not universal, but opinions
by state appellate courts rejecting the new right discussed the article extensively,
were usually split decisions that included a strong dissent, and often deferred to
the legislature, which in some states acted to fill the void.
By 1911, a small but growing body of common law and statutory law
afforded protections from a variety of invasions of privacy. In several states,
plaintiffs could obtain injunctions or recover damages, or both. And the
defendants in privacy cases were not just intrusive journalists or photographers
whose behavior was specifically and so strongly targeted by Brandeis and
Warren; rather, the cases represented a wider spectrum of American commerce
and life.
Part V seeks to answer the critical question of why the words of Brandeis
and Warren achieved the influence that they did. It is not enough to say merely
that the two authors presented cogent arguments. They did, but they also had
a potent ally for their arguments, an ally that Brandeis himself identified as a
great engine of change in the law: public opinion. 3 Professional and popular
opinion of the era were overwhelmingly and passionately in support of
protecting people's privacy in the face of cramped social conditions and the
proliferation ofamateur photography and gossip-mongering "yellow"joumalism
in the newly urban America. Almost unanimously, legal and lay commentators
from various scholarly publications, and editorial writers from major
mainstream newspapers such as The New York Times, condemned intrusions on
people's private lives that were perpetrated by the "tabloid" newspapers, as well
as by commercial advertisers and amateur photographers. These commentators
wrote ardently in support of legal redress for invasion of privacy, lauding the
decisions of courts establishing it, and criticizing-sometimes
contemptuously-the decisions of courts rejecting it. The Right to Privacy
achieved its early and generalized influence because its authors harnessed the

23. In a letter to his fiancee, Alice Goldmark, shortly after the article was published,
Brandeis wrote that "law is a dead letter without public opinion behind it. But law and public
opinion interact-and they are both capable of being made." 1 LETTERS OF LOuIS D. BRANDEIS
97 (Melvin 1.Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971) [hereinafter I LETTERS] (reprinting letter
from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890)).
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public's outrage at the intrusive elements of the newly urban society, and
channeled it into a forceful and well-reasoned appeal for change to the judicial
and legislative establishment.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: A POLEMIC AGAINST YELLOW JOURNALISM
AND A COGENT PLEA FOR A CHANGE INTHE LAW

The 1890 article was not the first joint venture that Brandeis and Warren
undertook. Indeed, it was not even the first law review article they wrote
together. 4 Both men graduated from Harvard Law School in 1877, Brandeis
graduating first in the class, and Warren second. 5 In 1879 the two friends
established a law practice together in Boston. 6
It is generally accepted that Warren's distaste for the Boston print media and
what he perceived to be its intrusions into the social privacy of citizens was the
impetus for The Right to Privacy.7 Although there is some disagreement among
scholars over whether Warren was disturbed about a specific report in a Boston
newspaper regarding private affairs of his own family, Warren was, by all
accounts, the one who initiated the idea of writing the article. 8 There is even
some indication that Brandeis may not have been extremely enthusiastic about
the venture. When he saw proofs of the article a few weeks before its
publication, Brandeis wrote to his fiancee that he had "not looked over all of it
yet, but
the little I read did not strike me as being as good as I had thought it
29
was."
Brandeis and Warren began with the premise that the common law had
always protected both person and property to some extent. The earliest
protections for the person were from physical violations in the nature of a
battery; the earliest protections for property were just for corporeal property."
Then the authors argued that over the course of history, the common law had

24. See Samuel D. Warren, Jr. & Louis D.Brandeis, The Watuppa Pond Cases, 2 HARV.
L. REv. 195 (1888); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Law ofPonds, 3 HARv. L.
REv. 1(1889).
25.
26.

MASON, supra note 6, at 47, 54.
Id. at 54-55.

27. See I LETTERS, supra note 23, at 302-03 ("My own recollection is that it was... a
specific suggestion of yours, as well as your deepseated abhorrence of the invasions of social
privacy, which led to our taking up the inquiry." (quoting Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to
Samuel Dennis Warren (April 8, 1905))). Warren wrote back, confirming to Brandeis, "You
are right about the genesis of the article." Id. at 303 n.3.
28. For a thorough historical analysis of the possible specific intrusions on Warren's
private life that prompted the article, see Barron, supra note 10, at 895-922.
29. 1LETTERS, supra note 23, at 94-95 (quoting Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice
Goldmark (Nov. 29, 1890)); see also id. at 100 (describing Brandeis's desire to do an article on
"'The Duty of Publicity'-a sort of companion piece to the last one that would really interest
me more." (quoting Letter from Louis D.Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891))).
30. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 193-94.
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responded to social, political and economic changes by expanding the protection
it affords person and property. Hence, persons were now protected from a threat
of a battery (assault), and also from damage to reputation (slander and libel).'
Similarly, property protected by the common law expanded to include intangible
items, such as products of the mind (copyright, trademarks, good will).32
The authors then alleged that the recent inventions of "[i]nstantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprise[s]," which were invading the "sacred
precincts of private and domestic life," were the latest changes in society that
demanded accommodation from the common law.33 Brandeis and Warren
engaged in a page-long diatribe against the newspaper press of the day to help
support their argument:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in
the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column
is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the
domestic circle.'
The authors also bemoaned the "unauthorized circulation of portraits"3 and
pictures of private persons by commercial photographers and advertisers.36
These alleged invasions of privacy were damaging to the feelings of the person
whose private life was invaded, according to Brandeis and Warren.3" The
existing cause of action for libel would not suffice, they argued, because such
an action only provided a remedy for damage to one's reputation with others in
and did not focus on direct damage to the feelings of the person
the community
38
aggrieved.
The authors asserted that, as a foundation, there must first be a legal right
to one's privacy. The stepping stone to a right to privacy, Brandeis and Warren
asserted, was what they described as a then existing common law right for a
person to decide if, when, and to what extent his "thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions [would] be communicated to others." 39 The authors cited as
illustrative of this right some English cases in which injunctions were granted

31.

Id.

32. Id. at 194-95.
33. Id. at 195.
34. Id. at 196.
35.

Id. at 195.

36. Id. at 195-96.
37. Id. at 197.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 198. Brandeis and Warren pointed out the distinction between this right, which
is the right to determine if one's creation will be published, and statutory rights from copyright
law, which are of value after publication. Id. at 198-200.
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to stop the publishing of someone else's intellectual or artistic property without
that person's consent.'" Any form of expression-by word, music, painting, or
otherwise-was covered by this right.4' This had generally been said to be an
enforcement of a right of property, the authors pointed out, but, relying on more
common law from England, they argued that such a basis for the protection was
a legal fiction. They declared, "[T]he protection afforded to thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the
arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the
enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone." ' 2 This
is the principle that Brandeis and Warren called the "inviolate personality." ' 3
If the legal "fiction of property" was to be maintained, Brandeis and Warren
wrote, it could simply be said that the law should protect one from the gossipmonger who takes that which is the "property" of another-facts about his
private life."
While Brandeis and Warren contended that, in some cases, courts of equity
should grant injunctions to stop invasions of the right to privacy, the crux of
their proposal was that courts of law should recognize a cause of action for
damages resulting from invasions of the right.45 Their proposed cause of action
arose out of one that existed in common law at the time: breach of implied
contract, trust, or confidence.' The authors pointed out two English cases in
which defendant photographers used copies of photographs of the plaintiffs for
their own commercial purposes. 4" The photographing sessions were done, in
both cases, under contract or an understanding that only a certain number of
copies were to be made, and only for the plaintiff." In both cases, the
defendants were found to have breached the contract or the confidence. 49
Brandeis and Warren claimed that now, with the developments in the science of
photography allowing sudden snapshots on the sly, it was no longer sufficient
to rely on contract law.5" Contract law did not allow a remedy against a
stranger, such as a prowling newspaper photographer." What they perceived
then as the next logical step was to allow a cause of action in tort, for invasion
of privacy."
40. Id. at 201-04.
41. Id. at 199.
42. Id. at 205.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 204-05.
45. Id. at 219.
46. Id. at 207-08.
47. Id. at 208-09 (discussing Tuck v. Priester, 19 Q.B.D. 639 (1887) and Pollard v.
Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.at211.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 210-11.
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The authors described a tort for which there was no need to plead special
damages; recovery could be had for "injury to feelings."53 The limitations
placed on the tort were several. First, the tort would not cover publication of
'
matters of "public or general interest."54
This is a reference-albeit an
implicit one-to a constitutionally protected zone for the press. Brandeis and
Warren carved out a category of public characters who "renounced their right
to live their lives screened from public observation," including candidates for,
and holders of, public office and others." The issues surrounding freedom of
the press and freedom of speech will be addressed in Part Il.
Brandeis and Warren recognized other caveats to the tort as well: (1) the
tort would not cover privileged communications, such as those made to a
public or legislative body; (2) the right to sue would cease upon publication
by the individual or upon his consent to publication; (3) the truth of the
private matter invaded and/or disclosed would not provide a defense; and (4)
absence of malice would not provide a defense.56
Brandeis and Warren did not believe they were arguing for a new right,
but rather the expansion of an existing one. The authors maintained that for
a century and a half, courts had protected a right to privacy, to a certain extent,
under the guise of a right to property and other legal fictions. They explained
that "to grant the further protection now suggested would be merely another
application of an existing rule."" Notwithstanding the authors' modest
assertion, the relevant "existing rules" in nineteenth century American law
were in fact long-established principles that would have to be fundamentally
altered to create a distinct right to privacy.

mU.

OBSTACLES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "RIGHT TO PRIVACY"

A. A Conspicuous Shortage of Precedent
As a concise but illuminating note in the 1981 HarvardLaw Review
pointed out,58 the law in nineteenth century America did afford a mishmash
of limited protections of people's privacy. The phrase "right of privacy" and
similar language certainly were not unknown to the law in 1890. Courts and
legislators of the nineteenth century invoked the phrase in a variety of
contexts.59 However, excepting protections provided through the criminal

53. Id.at 219.
54. Id.at 214.
55. Id.at 215.
56. Id. at216-18.
57. Id. at 213 n.1.
58. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1892
(1981).
59. See id. at 1895 (citing De Mayv. Roberts, 9 N.W.146, 149 (Mich. 1881) (involving
a trespass case in which an unauthorized medical assistant entered the bedchamber of a woman

2002]

THE BIRTH OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

law, such as the Fourth Amendment or statutes making eavesdropping a crime,
purported protections of privacy in nineteenth century American legislation
and common law were merely by-products of equitable and legal remedies
designed to address other wrongs.
If, in 1890, one were to seek an injunction from an American court of
equity to stop another person's prospective or actual conduct, that court would
almost certainly not take the case under consideration if the challenged
conduct did not cause injury to property.' And if one brought a cause of
action for damages in a court of law, that court would almost certainly not
take the case under consideration or permit it to reach a jury if the only
damages suffered by the plaintiff were a mental or psychological injury.6' It
was only within these parameters that aggrieved parties could obtain redress
for invasions of privacy in the nineteenth century in the United States. Thus,
in 1890, existing protections for privacy were completely unavailing, for
example, for the citizen whose most private and personal affairs were made
public by a newspaper or commercial profiteer. As such, there was no legally
protected right to privacy before 1890 in the United States.
Nineteenth century protections of privacy, all of which fell short of
constituting a meaningful "right to privacy," fell generally into the following
five categories:
(1) Libel: Libel was widely recognized before 1890, but truth was a defense
to any libel action. Hence, causes of action for libel were unavailing for
truthful accounts of private events or facts. In addition, as Brandeis and
Warren pointed out, libel was not a remedy for damage to feelings, but for
damage to one's reputation among others.62
(2) Fourth Amendment: The sanctity of domestic privacy, or the right to be
left alone in one's house, was enshrined in American law and culture
throughout the nineteenth century, and dated back to the birth of the republic
and the enactment of the Fourth Amendment. 3 Similarly indigenous to
American law and culture, and also a product of the Fourth Amendment, was
the "sanctity of the mails" and private papers, which in the mid nineteenth

in childbirth, thereby infringing on her "right of privacy"); Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589, 591
(1880) (involving a trespass case in which the court spoke of a houseguest's "right of quiet
occupancy and privacy")); id. at 1901-02 & n.74 (citing comments of a representative in the

1876 Congressional Record objecting to Congressional subpoenas for telegraph messages as
an "invasion of [private citizens'] privacy").
60. See Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 57 F.434,435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) ("The subjectmatter of the jurisdiction of a court of equity is civil property, and injury to property, whether
actual or prospective, is the foundation on which its jurisdiction rests."); see also Atkinson v.
John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285, 287 (Mich. 1899) (quoting same passage from Corliss).
61. Chapman v. W. Union Tel. Co., IS S.E. 901, 903-04 (Ga. 1892)("[T]he law does not
yet attempt to guard the peace of mind, the feelings, or the happiness of every one by giving
recovery of damages for mental anguish ... ").
62. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 197.
63. Note, supra note 58, at 1894-98.
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century was the driving force behind legislative efforts to protect the privacy
of messages sent by telegraph." Nonetheless, while a source of significant
protection for personal privacy, the Fourth Amendment to this day covers only
state action and safeguards against just certain types of intrusions on privacy.
Hence, it was not helpful to aggrieved parties, except in a small category of
cases.
(3) Tort of Trespass: The civil remedy for an invasion of one's domestic
privacy was a trespass action. However, these actions were limited to actual
physical invasions of private property."5
(4) Criminal Eavesdropping Laws: The only possible legal protections from
non-physical intrusions into one's private affairs (for example, the publication
of a truthful private fact about a person) were criminal laws of the era
outlawing eavesdropping. However, these precursors to today's wiretap laws
applied to only a limited category of non-physical invasions, and cases
implicating these statutes were rarely prosecuted.66
(5) Injunctions preventing publication of private letters: The civil remedy for
"invasion" of one's private papers was in equity. Equitable relief was granted
by some American courts of the nineteenth century to stop publication of
private letters contrary to the sender's wishes.6 ' This was an enforcement of
the common law right to which Brandeis and Warren referred in their article,
but in support of which they cited only English cases. The injunctions granted
in United States courts enjoined publication of written materials only, but did
so in some instances regardless of the literary merit or pecuniary value.6 8
Most important, though, is that these injunctions were granted expressly on
the basis of the tangible property right the sender or writer had in the physical
object: the letter.69
Extending the tradition-laden concept of property rights to include a right
to privacy was a leap that some courts were not willing to countenance. An
illustrative example is the 1899 decision by the Supreme Court of Michigan
in Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co.,° an invasion of privacy case in which
the court rejected the arguments of Brandeis and Warren. The court upheld
the denial of an injunction to stop the defendant from naming a cigar for the
plaintiff or placing his likeness on the cigar label, in large part because the
name and likeness of the plaintiff were not, in the court's view, "property,"
and hence the defendant had not violated any recognized right.7 The court

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1899-1904.
Id. at 1894-96; Kramer, supra note 10, at 705-06.
Note, supra note 58, at 1896.
See, e.g., Rice v. Williams, 32 F. 437,441 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1887); Folsom v. Marsh,

9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
68.
69.
70.
71.

See, e.g., Rice, 32 F. at 441; Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 346.
See, e.g., Rice, 32 F. at 441; Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 346.
80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899).
Id. at288-89.
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simply was not willing to eschew precedent and create a new right to privacy
on par with property rights.
Likewise, changing the tradition-laden rule that the law did not award
damages for psychological injury in the absence of a compensable physical
injury was a leap many courts were reluctant to take. A widely cited
statement of this rule regarding damages appeared in Chapman v. Western
Union Telegraph Co.,' in which the Supreme Court of Georgia observed,
The body, reputation, and property of the citizen are not to be invaded
without responsibility in damages to the sufferer. But, outside these
protected spheres, the law does not yet attempt to guard the peace of mind,
the feelings, or the happiness of every one by giving recovery of damages for
mental anguish.... The civil law is a practical business system, dealing with
what is tangible, and does not undertake to redress psychological injuries."'
The Chapman case proved to be influential. In Atkinson, for example, the
Supreme Court of Michigan relied on the principle set forth in Chapman as an
additional basis for rejecting Brandeis and Warren's proposals.74 When the
Court of Appeals of New York rejected the invasion of privacy cause of action
in 1902, the court also announced the above principle and quoted extensively
from Chapman.7" Warren and Brandeis themselves recognized in their article
that the law did not provide damages for "spiritual" injury.76 They argued that
the law should expand to encompass such a remedy, but that clearly was a tall
order given the attitudes of two very prominent state courts of last resort.
B. The Weighty Guns of the FirstAmendment77
With the benefit of several decades oftwentieth century First Amendment
jurisprudence, some scholars have seen an insoluble conflict between the
invasion of privacy tort fashioned by Brandeis and Warren and the First
Amendment Freedom of the Press Clause."8 They have found that conflict to

72. 15 S.E. 901 (Ga. 1892).
73. Id. at 903-04.
74. Atkinson, 80 N.W. at 288-89.

75. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 446 (N.Y. 1902)
76. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 197.
77. In 1890, and for at least three decades thereafter, it had not been established that the
First Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hall v. Post,
372 S.E.2d 711, 713 (N.C. 1988) (collecting cases in which U.S. Supreme Court recognized
First Amendment incorporation). However, similar protection was afforded by most state
constitutions. See Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co, 57 F. 434,435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) ("Freedom
of speech and of the press is secured by the constitution of the United States and the
constitutions of most of the states.").
78. See supra note 21. In the landmark defamation case of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and in invasion of privacy cases such as Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
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be the "greatest shortcoming" of the invasion of privacy remedy for which the
two authors argued.79 The issue of freedom of the press arises, of course,
because of the considerable focus that Brandeis and Warren placed on the
print media and its alleged violations of privacy. However, Brandeis and
Warren did not concentrate exclusively on the press. 0 They argued that a tort
remedy was needed not just to curb a nosy press, but also to redress the
unauthorized dissemination and commercial exploitation of photographs of
private persons taken "surreptitiously and without [their] consent."'
Naturally, this means their proposed remedy had the additional potential of
infringing on the right of free speech, particularly commercial speech.
How weighty was a defense of freedom of the press or speech in 1890?
Brandeis and Warren implicitly acknowledged this concern in their article by
crafting the "public interest" or "public character" exception to their tort,
which recognized that the press or commercial photographers had to be free
to record and report the actions ofpublic characters and officials. 2 However,

U.S. 374 (1967), Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. DistrictCourt, 430 U.S. 308 (1977), and Florida
Star v. B.JF., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), the Supreme Court established the news media's right to
publish matters of "public interest" as a nearly insurmountable defense in an invasion of privacy
cause of action alleging unreasonable publicity of one's private life (the "public disclosure" or
"private facts" tort). See Gormley, supra note 11, at 1386-90.
79. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 722.
80. Nonetheless, The Right to Privacy'sadmittedly heavy concentration on activities of
the press has led some scholars to conclude that Brandeis and Warren were truly only concerned
with one of the four invasion of privacy torts we know today. Barron, supra note 10, at 879;
Kalven, supra note 2, at 330. That is, of course, the third of the torts listed in the Restatement
(Second): "unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652A (1977). This has become known as the "public disclosure" or "private facts"
tort. However, the conduct of photographers (not necessarily affiliated with the print media),
of which Brandeis and Warren also complained, could implicate several, if not all, of the
remaining three invasion of privacy torts. Indeed, the taking of someone's photograph during
a private moment without his or her consent could be accomplished through an "unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another." Id. If the perpetrator then used the photograph for
commercial gain, he would be engaging in the "appropriation of the other's name or likeness."
Id. The last of the four torts, the "false light" tort, is not far afield either, as once photographs
or portraits of individuals are obtained without consent, they could be used in advertisements
to imply that the individual endorsed a certain product. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), discussed infra Part IV.
81. Warren & Brandeis, supranote 9, at 195 n.7. Brandeis and Warren referred to a thenpending case in which a Broadway performer clad in tights was photographed during her
performance. Id. She sought an injunction to stop the defendants from using the photograph.
Id. The case, Manola v. Stevens & Myers, apparently was never published in a legal reporter.
Id.
82. See Warren & Brandeis, supranote 9, at 214-15. In 1966, torts scholar Harry Kalven
went so far as to write that the "public interest" defense recognized by Warren and Brandeis was
"so overpowering as virtually to swallow the tort." Kalven, supra note 2, at 336. However, one
would be hard pressed to criticize Brandeis and Warren for failing to foresee that over a half-
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it was not until the latter half of the twentieth century that First Amendment
freedom of the press jurisprudence matured to fully address the impact of
freedom of the press on invasion of privacy actions.83 It was likewise not until
the latter half of the twentieth century that the Supreme Court began to define
commercial speech and the subordinate level of protection it would receive
under the First Amendment." A century ago, courts were wont to draw on the
treatise of famed nineteenth century judge and constitutional scholar, Thomas
Cooley, for a statement of the constitutional protection afforded speech and
the press.8 5 Cooley's proclamation on the issue suggests that freedoms of the
press and speech were, in essence, lumped together and treated more
uniformly than they are today:
The constitutional liberty of speech and of the press, as we understand
it, implies a right to freely utter and publish whatever the citizen may please,
and to be protected against any responsibility for so doing, except so far as
such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character,
may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice they may
injuriously affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of
individuals."

This potent right of "publication," encompassing the rights of free speech
and free press, surfaced as a matter of considerable concern for many state
courts confronting invasion of privacy cases of first impression in the late

century after writing their article, the Supreme Court would greatly expand on their "public
interest" defense to create a First Amendment "public interest" shield, which effectively permits
the print media to publish truthful information about anyone's private life if deemed
newsworthy. See supra note 78. See generally Gormley, supra note 11, at 1386-90.
83.

See supra note 78.

84. Until the 1970s, the Supreme Court's only explicit pronouncement on the degree of
protection afforded to commercial speech was in the case of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942). In Chrestensen, the Court stated that the First Amendment imposes no restraint on
government's authority to regulate "purely commercial advertising," accomplished in that case
by distributing handbills on a public thoroughfare. 316 U.S. at 54. In a series of opinions
beginning in 1973, the Court narrowed the holding of Chrestensen and carved out a special
category of "commercial speech" that was afforded a significant level of protection, but a level
less than that afforded to certain other types of speech. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
85. See, e.g., Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434, 435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) (citing
THOMAs M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 518 (6th ed. 1890) [hereinafter COOLEY

6th ed.]); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.68,73 (Ga. 1905) (citing THOMAS M.
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS

521

(5th ed. 1883) [hereinafter COOLEY 5th ed.]).

86. COOLEY 5th ed., supra note 85, at 521, quoted in Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73; see also
COOLEY 6th ed., supra note 85, at 518, quoted in Corliss, 57 F. at 435.
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.87 In 1893, the Federal Circuit Court for
the District of Massachusetts denied the plaintiff an injunction to prevent the
publishing of a "biographical sketch" of his life."8 In so doing, the court relied
on freedom of speech and freedom of the press, citing Cooley's treatise."' It also
distinguished another ruling in which an injunction was granted to prevent
invasion of privacy because the "right of publication" was not at issue in that
other case.* Likewise, the Supreme Court of Georgia, when it recognized the
invasion of privacy tort in 1905, discussed freedom of speech and of the press
extensively and counted it as a significant factor to be weighed in an invasion
of privacy case.9'
Thus, the First Amendment and state constitutional protections of free
speech and freedom ofthe press were an impediment to acceptance of The Right
to Privacy's proposals. Moreover, due to Brandeis and Warren's heavy

concentration on the conduct of the news media and photographers, the door
was left open for courts to interpret the article's arguments narrowly in privacyrelated cases unrelated to any right of publication-much like limiting the
precedential value of a case's holding to its specific facts. However, what
several courts of the era in fact did was read Brandeis and Warren's arguments
as more of a general endorsement of legal protection of privacy. Those courts
then proceeded to establish an invasion of privacy remedy or, in a few cases,
respectfully declined to do so but deferred to the states' legislatures.9 2 As will

be shown in Part IV, this broad interpretation of Brandeis and Warren's work
as a treatise on the general importance of a legal right to privacy--an
interpretation not unlike that contained in judicial opinions on privacy-related
cases today-appears in several published opinions from the era, some of which
did not pertain to a right of publication9" or even concern freedom of speech or
freedom of the press at all.94
IV. THE INVENTION OF ALEGAL RIGHT AND ATORT

Throughout the published cases from 1891 to 1911 addressing claimed
invasions of privacy, in both those accepting the cause of action and in those
rejecting it, there is discussion of The Right to Privacy and its arguments. Even
when a court did not expressly discuss The Right toPrivacyin its opinion, it still
87.

See, e.g., Pavesich,50 S.E. at 73 ("The stumbling block which many have encountered

inthe way of a recognition of the existence of aright of privacy has been that the recognition of
such right would inevitably tend to curtail the liberty of speech and of the press.").
88. Corliss, 57 F. at 434.
89. Id. at 435 (citing CooLEY 6th ed., supra note 85, at 518).
90. Id. The other case is Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1891),
discussed infra Part IV.
91. Pavesich,50 S.E. at 74.
92. See infra notes 152-55.
93. See, e.g., Schuyler, 15 N.Y.S. 787.
94. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Bd. of Comn'rs, 85 N.E. 32 (Ind. App. 1908).
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acknowledged the article and considered theories and concepts that had been
addressed by Brandeis and Warren.95 One can also see the obvious influence of
the Right to Privacyin the statutes that established an invasion of privacy cause
of action."
The first published opinion in an invasion of privacy case that cited The
Right to Privacywas Schuyler v. Curtis,97 a case in which the defendant was not
a member of the press or a commercial publisher. The case before the Supreme
Court of New York, Special Term, New York County, was brought by the
nephew of the deceased Mrs. George Schuyler.98 The defendant intended to
erect a statue of Mrs. Schuyler to be exhibited as a "[t]ypical [p]hilanthropist"
at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago." No one in the Schuyler family ever
consented to the project. " The suit was for a preliminary injunction to stop the
defendant from erecting the statue."0 ' Judge O'Brien granted the injunction,
acknowledging that "there is no reported decision which goes to this extent in
maintaining the right of privacy, and in that respect this is a novel case.""
O'Brien expressly relied on the Brandeis-Warren article to justify his extension
of the law, quoting three full paragraphs from the article and asserting that it
"well deserves and will repay the perusal of every lawyer."' 3 Consistent with
Brandeis and Warren's theories, Judge O'Brien assessed whether Schuyler was
a "public character" and concluded she was not."
In two subsequent appeals, New York intermediate appellate courts upheld
the injunction. 5 The suit in Schuyler was clearly suggested by The Right to
Privacy,and the decisions of all three courts were based upon the theories that
Brandeis and Warren advanced."
Brandeis and Warren "may flatter
themselves with having pointed the way for both court and counsel in the
Schuyler case," wrote one author of a law review article in 1897.107

95. See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240, 248-49 (N.Y.
Spec. Term 1891).
96. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text regarding the New York legislature's
enactment of a statute creating a right to privacy.
97. 15 N.Y.S. 787 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1891). A full text of this opinion appeared in the
journal Green Bag. The Right to Privacy, 3 GREEN BAG 524 (1891).
98. 15 N.Y.S. at 787.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 788.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Schuyler v. Curtis, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1892); Schuyler v. Curtis, 24
N.Y.S. 509 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1893).
106. Adams, supra note 3, at 41.
107. Augustus N. Hand, Schuyler Against Curtis and the Right to Privacy, 36 AM. LAW
REG. & REV. (n.s.) 745, 752 (1897).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69:623

In December 1893, an injunction was granted in the case of Marks v.
Jaffa,OS in which the defendant, a newspaper, published pictures of two actors
and asked readers to vote for the one they found more appealing."° The
pictures were printed without the actors' consent. "' The Marks opinion cited
Schuyler v. Curtis and The Right to Privacy to support its result."'
Interestingly, freedom of speech and freedom of the press were not discussed
in Marks.
The New York Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the granting of the
Schuyler injunction in 1895,' but the holding was based on the fact that the
statue was to be of a worman who was deceased, and her right of privacy, if
any, had died with her." 3 The question of whether New York recognized an
invasion of privacy cause of action remained unresolved by the state's highest
court. However, Judge (and future United States Supreme Court Justice)
Peckham, in dicta, argued strongly in favor of recognizing such a cause of
4
action. "'
Seven years later, the courts of New York decided another prominent
case, Roberson v. Rochester FoldingBox Co."5 The defendant, without the
knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, printed thousands of lithographic prints
of the plaintiff and used them in poster advertisements for flour." 6 Above the
portrait of the plaintiff-a young woman-were the words "Flour of the
Family.""' Copies of the advertisement were posted in stores, warehouses
and saloons throughout the United States."' The plaintiff sought an
injunction to restrain the use of the lithographic likeness of her.' ' The lower
court granted the injunction, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in an opinion by Judge
Rumsey 20 In the opinion, Judge Rumsey conceded that the theory upon
which the plaintiff relied was new and even questioned if "it can be said that
there are any authoritative cases establishing her right to recover in this
action."' 2 ' The precedents upon which Rumsey relied partially were Schuyler
and Marks.2 2 Rumsey cited many of the same English cases upon which

108.

26 N.Y.S. 908 (N.Y. City Super. Ct. 1893).

109. Id. at 909.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
42N.E. 22(N.Y. 1895).
Id. at 25.
Id. at26.
64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
Id. at442.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 71 N.Y.S. 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901).
Id. at 877.
Id. at 883.
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Brandeis and Warren relied in order to come to the conclusion that equity can
protect more than just property rights." 3 Then he argued, much as Warren
and Brandeis did, that if there must be a right of property at issue, the
injunction in the case can rest upon the right of property the plaintiff has in
her own body.'24
The New York Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief Judge Parker for
a bare 4-3 majority, reversed Judge Rumsey's decision. 5 The court relied
heavily on the lack of precedent for the legal and equitable remedies sought.
The court wrote that establishing the suggested tort action would inundate
courts with petty, absurd claims of invasion of people's privacy, such as "a
comment upon one's looks, conduct, domestic relations or habits."'2 6 Judge
Gray authored the dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the plaintiff had
a property right in her face and any portrait of it.'
The decision of New York's highest court was widely criticized and, as
will be seen in Part V, produced nothing short of a public outcry. The outcry
led directly to the New York legislature's 1903 enactment of a statute making
it a misdemeanor to use the name, portrait or picture of anyone for advertising
purposes or purposes of trade without that person's consent.' The law also
allowed a court to issue an injunction in a civil case to enjoin someone from
doing such an act.' 29 The statute, clearly a direct response to the factual
scenario in Roberson, created a limited scope of protected privacy and was
certainly an accommodation of Brandeis and Warren's view. That statute was
upheld as constitutional by the New York Court of Appeals 3 0 and the United
State Supreme Court.' It is still on the books in New York today.' 32
Following the lead of New York, the legislatures of Virginia,' in 1904,
and Utah, 34 in 1909, adopted very similar statutes. They were also following
the lead of California's legislature, which in 1899 had criminalized the nonconsensual publication of a person's portrait.'

123.

Id. at 879-80.

124. Id. at 880.
125. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
126. Id. at443.
127. Id. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting).
128. 1903 N.Y. Laws 132, § 1.
129. ld. § 2.
130. Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 85 N.E. 1097 (N.Y. 1908).
131. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502 (1911) (holding that prohibiting
a purported owner of another's photograph from using it for commercial gain does not deprive
that owner of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment).
132. N.Y. Cirv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2001).
133. VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 2000); see also Gormley, supra note 11, at 1354.
134. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-406 (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-3 (1998 & Supp.
2000); see also Gormley, supra note 11, at 1354.
135. See Gormley, supra note 11, at 1354 n.90. The California provision, made a part of
the state's criminal libel laws, was repealed in 1915. Id. In 1903, Pennsylvania passed a law
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The first court of last resort to adopt the invasion of privacy cause of
action was the Supreme Court of Georgia, which, in the 1905 case of Pavesich
v. New England Life Insurance Co.,136 recognized a cause of action in tort
almost identical to the action that Brandeis and Warren set forth. The facts
involved a non-consensual use of the plaintiff's picture in a newspaper
advertisement on which there was a promotional statement falsely attributed
to the plaintiff.' 37 The Supreme Court of Georgia found the right to privacy
in natural law, 138 and held that special damages are not necessary to state a
cause of action because an infringement on privacy "is a direct invasion of a
legal right."' 39 The opinion cited The Right to Privacy very favorably and
mentioned the authors by name."4 In fact, Judge Cobb, who wrote the
opinion, sent a letter to Brandeis calling his attention to the decision.' 4' As
previously noted, Cobb addressed freedom of speech and of the press, but
concluded that publishing another's picture in an advertisement without his
consent was not the expression of a sentiment or an idea that should receive
constitutional protection. 142 In the following passage, Judge Cobb elevated the
newfound right to privacy to a status essentially on par with that of the longestablished protections of freedom of speech and of the press:
Those to whom the right to speak and write and print is guarantied [sic] must
not abuse this right, nor must one in whom the right of privacy exists abuse
this right. The law will no more permit an abuse by the one than by the
other. Liberty of speech and of the press is and has been a useful instrument
to keep the individual within limits of lawful, decent, and proper conduct;
and the right of privacy may be well used within its proper limits to keep
those who speak and write and print within the legitimate bounds of the
constitutional guaranties [sic] of such rights. One may be used as a check
upon the other, but neither can be lawfully used for the other's destruction."'
The decision in Pavesich gave Brandeis and Warren's arguments a
tremendous assist because other states' courts now had an opinion from a
respected state supreme court on which to rely. As a direct result, within six
years, four other states had recognized some form of an invasion of privacy
remedy. In 1907, a chancery court in New Jersey enjoined the commercial
allowing the recovery of civil damages for "negligent but nondefamatory newspaper
publications." Id. at 1354 n.92. In 1907, it was repealed. Id. (citing 1907 Pa. Laws 124).
136. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
137.
138.

Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 70-71.
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Id.
at 73.

140.

Id.at 74.

141. See I LETTERS, supra note 23, at 303 ("1 thank you for your courtesy in calling my
attention to the decision .. " (quoting letter from Louis Brandeis to Andrew Jackson Cobb
(April 17, 1905))).
142.
143.

Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80.
Id. at 74.
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usage of Thomas Edison's name, picture, and certificate on a product of the
defendant.'" The court reviewed the history of cases, including Pavesich and
Roberson, and concluded that Pavesich was the better view.4" In 1908, in a case
having nothing to do with the print media or commercial use of another's
likeness, an Indiana appellate court recognized a limited right to privacy, granting
a new trial on a homeowner's claim of invasion of privacy due to prisoners in a
nearby jail being able to see into her home.'" The court cited Pavesich as
authority. 47 The Court of Appeals ofKentucky recognized an invasion ofprivacy
tort, specifically for the commercial use of another's picture, in the 1909 case of
Foster-MillburnCo. v. Chinn.'" The court cited Pavesich as authority for the
new cause of action, for which special damages were not necessary.'49 Then, in
early 1911, a Missouri intermediate appellate court adopted a very similar cause
of action, again not requiring special damages." 0 The Missouri court cited
directly to Pavesich and The Right to Privacyas authority.''
By 1911, the courts in Georgia, New Jersey, Indiana, Kentucky, and
Missouri, and the legislatures in California, New York, Utah, and Virginia all had
recognized some right to privacy and adopted a means of seeking redress for
violations of that right. The rights and remedies established by most of these
states were similar to those for which Brandeis and Warren had argued in 1890,
but they were not limited in every state to redressing only the misbehavior of the
press or commercial publishers. To be sure, some states did limit the cause of
action to only non-consensual publication of one's photograph or portrait, and
others granted only equitable remedies or adopted only criminal penalties.
However, the common link in all of the new causes of action was reliance on the
theories posited by Brandeis and Warren in The Right to Privacy.
Even the courts that rejected a right to privacy or declined to apply it to the
specific facts of a case found the article of considerable importance. As noted
above, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Atkinson, cited the article, considered the
arguments, and deferred to the legislature." 2 The same goes for the New York
Court of Appeals in Roberson;' the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the 1909

case ofHenry v. Cherry & Webb, in which the article is quoted extensively;'5 and
the Supreme Court of Washington in Hillman v. Star PublishingCo.'"
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V. "LAW IS A DEAD LETTER WITHOUT PUBLIC OPINION BEHIND IT"

Why did The Right to Privacy-alaw review article, after all-influence such
a change in the law? And why did it attract the dutiful and deferential attention
of the courts that declined to adopt an invasion of privacy remedy? The evidence
points rather convincingly to a classic engine of change in the law: public
opinion. Among the lay public, and in the legal profession of the day, there was
a fervid desire for some protection of privacy. This fervor provided the push that
the law needed to overcome the obstacles standing in the way of the growth of a
privacy right. Brandeis himself wrote shortly after the article was published that
"law is a dead letter without public opinion behind it. But law and public opinion
interact-and they are both capable of being made."' 56 To a great extent, The
Right to Privacy "made" the law protecting privacy, but it was the social and
cultural changes of the industrial era that "made" the public opinion in support of
enacting such laws, and that gave the article a potent assist in giving birth to its
namesake.
The social and cultural impact of industrialization and urbanization in the last
two decades of the nineteenth century reveals a country suffering growing pains.
In the ten years before The Right to Privacy was published, the number of7
Americans living in cities with populations over 2,500 rose by seven million.'
In 1840, there were only twelve cities in the United States with populations over
25,000; by 1890, there were 124.58 Many people in these new industrial urban
centers lived in "overcrowded tenements... and teeming slums."' 59 The close
proximity in which people were forced to live, and the necessity in the big cities
of relying on others for many services, made privacy a dwindling commodity.
A parallel development of the industrial era was the rampant growth of
newspapers and photojournalism. There were 625 daily newspapers in the United
States that began publishing between 1880 and 1889."6 Most of these
newspapers appealed to the new industrial urban workers with titillating gossip
and prurient details about the private lives of public figures and members of high
society-with accompanying photographs.' 6 ' This was "yellowjournalism" at its
peak
It was not just Warren and Brandeis who found the press to be
meddlesome and worthy of reproach. In an 1886 speech, President Grover
Cleveland condemned journalists as publishers of "silly, mean, and cowardly
lies that every day are found in the columns of certain newspapers which

156. 1 LETTERS, supra note 23, at 97 (quoting Letter from Louis Brandeis to Alice
Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890)).
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FIRST AMENDMENT 7 (1972).
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violate every instinct of American manliness, and in ghoulish glee desecrate
every sacred relation of private life."' 62 It was widely known that President
Theodore Roosevelt was very annoyed by photojournalists who followed him
and snapped photographs of him during his administration. 63 Elbridge
Adams, who was the attorney for the victorious defendant in the Roberson
case before the New York Court of Appeals, wrote in a 1905 law review
article, "It will probably not be seriously questioned that the American
newspaper press.., has far overstepped the bounds of decency and propriety
in its betrayal by word and by picture of the private life of individuals."'" An
article in one publication in 1902 referred to "these days of unbridled and
reckless advertising and sensationalism in newspapers. "165
American urbanites of the late nineteenth century were confronted not
only with the pervasiveness ofprofessional "yellowjoumalism," but also with
the popularization of amateur photography. The invention and marketing of
the hand-held camera in the 1880s, most notably George Eastman's "Kodak"
camera,
completely changed the conception of who was to practice photography.
Photography was no longer the province of the professional and affluent
amateur, but was practiced by thousands and thousands of people .... By
1889, the New York Tribune was able to report that '[a]mateur photography

is rapidly approaching, if it has not already reached, the dignity of a 'craze.'
The New York Times also reported a remarkable increase in the popularity
of photography as a hobby.'"
With a portable, easily concealed camera in hand, some of these amateur
photographers, like the professional photojournalists of the day, were an
opportunistic sort. They responded to the market demand for photographs of
prominent people at unguarded moments by snapping them on the sly and then
selling them to newspapers or other publications.'6 7 One scholar's essay on
the impact of amateur photography on privacy in New York City argues that
the popular fascination with cameras and photographs in the 1880s and 1890s
162. Id. at 16 (quoting Newspaper Espionage, FORUM, August 1886, at 533).
163. See, e.g., The Right of Privacy,N.Y.TIMSF, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8.
164. Adams, supra note 3, at 50.
165. The Right of Privacy, 24 NAT'L CORP. REP. 709 (1902).
166. Robert E. Mensel, "KodakersLying in Wait ": Amateur Photographyand the Right
of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 28 (1991) (citing the New York Tribune,
Sept. 5, 1889, at6, and the New York Times, Feb. 25, 1889, at 8; May 14, 1889, at 9; May 20,
1889, at 5; Aug. 5, 1889, at 2).
167. Id. at 31. Mensel argues that the popularization of cameras and amateur photography
in New York City produced a "culture" of photography that prized capturing a subject's "'real'
feelings, character and personality," traits that could best be recorded when the subject was
unaware of the photographer's presence. Id. He further argues that because this "culture" of
photography necessarily led to intrusions on the privacy of unwitting subjects, it was a potent
impetus for the recognition of a right of privacy by the New York legislature. Id. at 25, 32.
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also produced a very large market for various and sundry pictures of common,
everyday members of the working class, and that such pictures were sold at
a wide variety of shops throughout New York City, and even dispensed in
vending machines. 6 8
This urban environment of the late nineteenth century, with close living
quarters, interdependent citizens, and intrusive journalists and amateur
photographers, was conducive to the law stepping in and providing some
relief.
A. Opinion of the Legal Community
The opinions of those in the legal profession who wrote during this era
reflect the widespread support among lawyers and legal commentators for
some remedy for invasion of privacy. Scores of articles appeared in legal
periodicals in the two decades after The Right to Privacy was published.
Articles were written about Brandeis and Warren's work itself, the right to
privacy, cases addressing the right to privacy, and the potential remedies for
invasion of privacy. Research reveals only two articles from the era expressly
and unequivocally opposed to the cause of action suggested by Brandeis and
Warren. 69 One of these articles was written by a judge of the New York
Court of Appeals, who wrote to defend the Roberson decision after it was
attacked by The New York Times.' 0
Legal writers found much to praise in the Brandeis-Warren article itself.
The popular legal journal, Green Bag, called the article a "very able review"
and quoted extensively from it in an article calling for the recognition of a
right to privacy.' 7 ' In an 1895 article in the American Law Register and
Review, the author wrote that the Brandeis-Warren piece "admirably and
One lawyer wrote that
exhaustively discussed" the right to privacy.'
"excellent legal analogies can be invoked in support of such a right [to
privacy] and none of the arguments against it are at all convincing."'7
In both the more popularly oriented legal periodicals and in the law
reviews of the day, there was strong support for court decisions establishing
an invasion of privacy remedy and criticism for those rejecting it. As early as
1891, after the first Schuyler decision, Green Bag characterized the decision
granting the injunction and recognizing a right to privacy as "edifying to the

168. Id. at 32-33.
169. Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1894); Denis O'Brien, The Right
ofPrivacy,2 COLuM. L. REv. 437 (1902).
170. O'Brien, supra note 169, at 438; see infra Part V.B.
171. The Right to Privacy, 6 GREEN BAG 498, 498 (1894).
172. Samuel Dreher Matlack, Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co. United States Circuit Court,
Districtof Massachusetts,43 AM. LAW REG. & REV. 134, 135 (1895).
173. Hand, supra note 107, at 759.
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profession, and cover[ing] a subject of... vital importance."'" 4 The Schuyler
lower court opinions upholding the injunction produced a large amount of.
commentary in legal publications, the majority of which was positive. The
legal press also approved of the lower court opinions in Roberson that
recognized a right to privacy.' The same press was very critical of the
reversal by the New York Court of Appeals, leading one legal publication to
conclude that every comment on the decision, save one, had been adverse." 6
The Yale Law Journalwrote that the Court of Appeals's decision would only
strengthen the claim of the "sensational press of to-day, of a right to pry into
and grossly display before the public matters of the most private and personal
concern."'"" The Michigan Law Review criticized the Washington Supreme
Court for its decision rejecting the invasion of privacy tort in the Hillman
case, concluding that "[t]he demands of yellow journalism hardly should be
the final test of legitimate legal publicity."'" 8
B. Opinion of the Lay Public
Among the lay public, many of whom were the private citizens whose
privacy was being curtailed, support was strong for a legal right to privacy and
for the theories advanced by Brandeis and Warren. The main gauge of public
opinion I have employed--editorial and news coverage in The New York
Times and a few other popular publications-is, to be sure, not necessarily
representative of public sentiment throughout the United States. In addition,
when one considers that it is newspapers themselves whose rights might be
infringed upon if the invasion of privacy tort were to be accepted, drawing
public opinion from the pages of newspapers is, at first blush, suspect.
However, in light of the anti-press attitude that was part of the push for a right
to privacy, it seems the strong support for the right in the editorial pages of
The New York Times and in other publications, and the repeated coverage of
major privacy-related cases in their news pages, are all the more remarkable
and all the more telling of the vigor of public opinion.
All four of the Schuyler decisions and both of the reported Roberson
decisions were covered in a news article and/or discussed in an editorial in
The New York Times."' The first Schuyler appeal, before the General Term
174. The Right to Privacy, 3 GREEN BAG 524, 524 (1891).
175. See, e.g., The Right of Privacy, supra note 165.
176. Protection ofPrivacy, 25 NAT'L CORP. REP. 183 (1902).
177. Comment, An Actionable Right ofPrivacy? Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,
12 YALE L.J. 35, 37-38 (1902).
178. Libel-Right ofPrivacy--Publicationof Photograph,10 MICH. L. REv. 335 (1912).
179. See N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1891, at4; The Mrs. Schuyler Statute Case: Argument on
Appeal Heard in Supreme Court Yesterday, N.Y. TIMEs, May 14, 1892, at 8; Must Not Build
the Statue: Decision in the Mrs. Mary Hamilton Schuyler Matter,N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1892,
at 12; Victory for the Schuylers: No Statue of Mary Hamilton Schuyler at the World's Fair,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1893, at 16; The Right to Privacy,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1895, at 4; Used
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of the Supreme Court, was considered newsworthy enough to warrant an article
summarizing the arguments that both sides were making before the court.'
This news article made reference to the public opinion regarding the facts of the
case: "When the case first came up last year it caused a great deal of comment,
and there was a general condemnation of the determination of the [defendant]
to carry out the project against the wishes of Mrs. Schuyler's relatives. '
From 1891 to 1902, there were at least five editorials in The New York
Times regarding decisions in the Schuyler or Roberson cases." 2 All of them
were in favor of recognizing an invasion of privacy cause of action, some of
them passionately so. In response to the first Schuyler opinion of September
189 1, which recognized a right to privacy, the Times's editors commented that
it is "a very good thing for society in general, that a court of law should have
been invoked with success to vindicate the right to privacy."' The editorials
were most impassioned and determined when criticizing the New York Court
of Appeals for its decisions adverse to the right to privacy. The Times
denounced the Court of Appeals's 1895 decision in Schuyler (reversing the
grant of an injunction to stop erection of the statue of the late Mrs. Schuyler, on
the grounds that Mrs. Schuyler's alleged right to privacy did not survive her),
declaring one of the duties of "conscientious journalism" to be "[o]verruling the
courts of last resort" whenever appropriate.' In this particular case, to the
editors of the Times, it was appropriate.
The Times's strongest venom was reserved for the Court ofAppeals's 1902
decision in the Roberson case. The Roberson decision was criticized heavily in
three editorials, one of which provides a revealing look at the public sentiment
of the day. In it, the Times's editors bitterly condemned the opinion and
launched nothing short of a personal attack on the author of it, Judge Parker:
If that young woman [the plaintiff] had happened to be the daughter of Judge
PARKER, we are of the opinion that the incident might have induced his Honor
to reconsider with some care the decision that no private person had any rights
which the purveyors of publicity were bound to respect.
In this series of events we can see political evolution at work. We can see
the effect of public opinion upon law and institutions in the making. For all
these things appeal to the decent and unsophisticated human mind as
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outrages. And the highest legal authority in the greatest State in the Union
assures us that they are outrages for which the law provides no remedy. So
much the worse for the law, say all the decent people.' 85
In that same editorial, the Times boldly asserted that "[w]e happen to know"
the Court
of Appeals's Roberson decision excited "amazement" among the lay
86
public.1
Public disapproval of the decision was not limited to New York. The
National Corporation Reporter, published in Chicago, criticized the decision in
one article, calling for legislative action." 7 The attention the decision attracted
was widespread. Elbridge Adams wrote three years after the decision that it, in
fact, caused discussion of the issue "all over the world."'8 8
The appearance of the New York Times editorial castigating the New York
Court of Appeals for its decision in Roberson was enough to cause Court of
Appeals Judge Denis O'Brien, who was in the Roberson majority, to write an
article in the ColumbiaLaw Review defending and explaining the decision, which
he thought had been misconstrued by the Times and by the public. 9 As if that
exchange of opinion between a daily newspaper and a state court judge was not
remarkable enough, the New York Times responded to the response with another
editorial." 9 This time, the editors used gentler language but argued again that the
decision of the court was wrong. The editorial closed by arguing that "some
legislation is needed."' 91 As was seen in Part IV, legislation was in fact enacted
in 1903, and the statute was certainly a direct response to the public disapproval
of the Court of Appeals's decision. As such, the rapidity with which the statute
was passed is reflective of the strength of public sentiment.
Three years after Roberson, in an editorial praising the Pavesich decision
from Georgia, the Times's editors got in a few more digs at the Court of Appeals
when they wrote that the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Georgia "is
that which most open-minded men, including a formidable part of bench and bar,
reached in the discussion which the decision of our Court of Appeals, instead of
closing, merely opened."'92
The Pavesichdecision of 1905 was naturally a newsworthy event in Georgia
as well. The Atlanta Constitution ran a lengthy news article about the Georgia
Supreme Court's decision the day after it was issued.'93 The very large headline
read "Used Picture Without Right."' 94

185.

The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, August 23, 1902, at 8.

186.

Id.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

The Right ofPrivacy,supra note 165.
Adarns, supra note 3, at 45.
O'Brien, supra note 169.
The Right of Privacy,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1902, at 5.
Id.
The Right ofPrivacy,N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1905, at 8.
Used Picture Without Right, ATLANTA CONST., March 4, 1905, at 7.
Id.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69:623

It seems beyond dispute that at the dawn of the twentieth century, the
American legal community and lay public zealously supported the enactment
of legal protection for their privacy. At least in New York, that support was
overwhelming and acted as a catalyst for the state's legislative branch to act.
It would appear that the public outrage over intrusions into privacy was so
fervid that if Warren and Brandeis had not formulated a legal remedy for such
intrusions, "somebody else would have had to invent a similar legal concept,
by whatever name, in short order."' ' But, it was Warren and Brandeis who
keenly recognized the public's distress over the waning of privacy, and they
craftily devised and disseminated an original legal remedy to placate that
distress. By so doing, they get the credit for spawning a mini-revolution in
the law, a revolution that eventually spread throughout the United States and
throughout several fields of law to give us a wide-ranging right to privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
For years to come, when American judges, legal commentators and
scholars ofmany stripes are confronted with cases and issues about someone's
right to privacy, many of them will do as their predecessors have been doing
for more than a century-begin their analysis with a review of Louis Brandeis
and Samuel Warren's The Right to Privacy and credit it with having invented
the right to privacy. And they will be justified in doing so.
To be sure, Brandeis and Warren did not write an article in 1890
expounding on the need for the myriad protections of privacy the law now
provides. Even within their limited focus of fashioning a tort remedy for
invasions of privacy, they proposed something far from perfect: a cause of
action that bucked well-established precedent, and that had the potential to
infringe severely on the First Amendment rights of freedom of the press and
of speech.
However, what Brandeis and Warren did so effectively was provide a
voice before the law for the public's outrage over intrusions into private lives
by gossip-mongering newspapers and commercial and amateur photographers.
The "voice" Brandeis and Warren provided was in the form of an incisive and
cogently written law review article about the need for the common law to
respond to society's new threats to privacy by giving privacy its own legal
protection. Accordingly, despite its flaws, Brandeis and Warren's article
succeeded in prodding the common law to change and in influencing some
legislatures to act. Through its well-reasoned plea for recognition of a new
right protecting privacy, Brandeis and Warren's treatise was the catalyst and
the "precedent" for the evolution of such a right, a right that ultimately
blossomed into all that we know today as "privacy law."
While the question of whether The Right to Privacyhad a direct influence
on the development of more modem privacy law can be, and has been,
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debated by scholars, any attenuation of the article's link to privacy law in the
latter part of the twentieth century and early part of the twenty-first century
was, and is, the result of the changing needs of societies in new eras. Brandeis
and Warren could not have been expected to anticipate society's and law's
multitudinous changes in the next century when they wrote in 1890. Brandeis
and Warren responded to the needs of the society in the era during which they
wrote and lived. To their credit, they did so with profound insight and
compelling words that resound still today, even after a century of societal and
legal changes. As a result, they should not be denied their place as the
inventors of the right to privacy, and their article should not be denied its
status as a true classic in legal literature.

